Abstract-BGP is known to have many security vulnerabilities due to the very nature of its underlying assumptions of trust among independently operated networks. Most prior efforts have focused on attacks that can be addressed using traditional cryptographic techniques to ensure authentication or integrity, e.g., BGPSec and related works. Although augmenting BGP with authentication and integrity mechanisms is critical, they are, by design, far from sufficient to prevent attacks based on manipulating the complex BGP protocol itself. In this paper, we identify two serious attacks on two of the most fundamental goals of BGP-to ensure reachability and to enable ASes to pick routes available to them according to their routing policies-even in the presence of BGPSec-like mechanisms. Our key contributions are to (1) formalize a series of critical security properties, (2) experimentally validate using commodity router implementations that BGP fails to achieve those properties, (3) quantify the extent of these vulnerabilities in the Internet's AS topology, and (4) propose simple modifications to provably ensure that those properties are satisfied. Our experiments show that, using our attacks, a single malicious AS can cause thousands of other ASes to become disconnected from thousands of other ASes for arbitrarily long, while our suggested modifications almost completely eliminate such attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE BORDER Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the Internet's de facto interdomain routing protocol wherein routers across different autonomous systems (ASes) exchange reachability information about destination prefixes; each router selects the most preferred route to each destination prefix and re-announces that route to its neighbors that in turn do the same. As deployed today, BGP lacks the most minimal of security mechanisms implicitly assuming all routers to be trustworthy, therefore malicious ASes can launch a variety of attacks [13] , [25] that include control plane attacks such as prefix hijacking, spoofing, altering or faking routes, unauthorized prefix aggregation or de-aggregation, etc. as well as data plane attacks such as dropping, rerouting, or delaying packets.
Many comprehensive security measures have been proposed to limit the impact of misbehavior in BGP. These include measures to secure the control plane using cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate and verify the integrity of received routes and their implied prefix ownership (e.g., BGPsec, S-BGP and a line of related work [11] , [18] , [19] , [24] , [36] ). At the time of writing, IETF is promoting the standardization of BGPsec, and the resource certificate mechanism that underlies BGPsec, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), is being deployed over the Internet. Furthermore, measures to ensure data plane security have also been proposed, e.g., verification mechanisms to check that the routes selected in the control plane are consistently used in the data plane for forwarding traffic [12] , [17] , [33] , [37] .
On the surface, it may appear that combining control plane mechanisms for authentication and integrity of route announcements with data plane mechanisms to verify forwarding behavior is sufficient to eliminate the most potent of attacks in BGP. However, we show in this paper that these existing mechanisms, although valuable for addressing their targeted vulnerabilities, are by design far from sufficient for addressing the class of security attacks discussed in this paper.
Our primary contribution is to demonstrate that BGP, despite being equipped with mechanisms for route authentication and verification, is still vulnerable to serious attacks based on manipulating the complex BGP protocol itself. We refer to these attacks as protocol manipulation attacks, a class of control plane attacks that can not (and were never intended to) be addressed using BGPsec-like cryptographic mechanisms alone, but can cause significant damage nevertheless. For example, we show that an off-path malicious AS can cause a victim AS to think that it has no usable route to a destination even though a route consisting only of good ASes to the destination is being announced to the victim. More disturbingly, it is possible for the malicious AS to block the destination from the victim permanently.
Our position is that manipulation attacks, attacks that can often be counterintuitive and difficult to anticipate, exist because we poorly understand the properties that the complex BGP protocol ought to satisfy in the presence of malicious ASes. To address this state of affairs, we formalize two desirable correctness properties that we posit BGP ought to satisfy. These two properties pertain respectively to the two most fundamental goals of BGP, namely to ensure reachability and enable ASes to pick routes according to their routing policies, and can be informally summarized as follows. The first specifies that if a policy-compliant route to a destination consisting of only good ASes is available to an AS, the routing protocol should guarantee that the AS is able to eventually reach the destination. The second specifies that a malicious AS should not be able to force a good AS to pick a less preferred good route if multiple good routes are available.
Although these properties sound rather weak, we identify attack scenarios wherein even a single malicious AS or router can cause BGP to violate both properties. In our attack scenarios, a malicious AS exploits the fact that routers employ Routing Flap Damping (RFD) and/or Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI) timers. These timers have been historically considered critical to ensure the stability of the routing protocol and to reduce message overhead, but malicious ASes can abuse them in a manner that effectively makes a good route "disappear" from the victims routing table. Our attacks neither require all routers to deploy these mechanisms nor implement them in the same manner in order to be successful. On the contrary, we show that the attacks work even if different ASes have different parameter settings (Sections IV and VI) and, in fact, there exist scenarios where partial deployment of these mechanisms can exacerbate the severity of these attacks causing more ASes to become potential victims (Section VII(A)). We analytically derive sufficient conditions that allow an attacker to successfully commit the attack despite unpredictable network propagation delays or non-uniform deployment of these timers. We experimentally show that these attacks are feasible using commodity router implementations (Section V). Finally, through simulations using the Internet's AS topology, we show that strategically positioned attackers can potentially disconnect thousands of ASes from thousands of other ASes (Section VII).
We note that there has been disagreement over the years (as detailed in Section II) on the recommended parameter settings for both RFD and MRAI timers (and whether to use them at all) as poorly chosen values can worsen convergence delays and intermittent unreachability compared to not using them at all. Our work is complementary in focus and does not seek to address this debate; instead it enables practitioners to assess the security implications of recommended best practices with respect to these timers. We do show that simple modifications to the timer mechanisms (short of merely disabling them altogether) do not suffice to eliminate the identified attacks. To our knowledge, security considerations have not substantively influenced the large body of prior work studying these timers.
We reiterate important disclaimers regarding our protocol manipulation attacks and proposed correctness properties. First, our attacks do not expose flaws in the design of existing BGP security proposals (such as BGPsec) as these schemes focus on protecting BGP messages, and were not designed to address protocol manipulation attacks presented in the paper. Nor do they undermine the value of deploying these schemes. We only show that our attacks are feasible whether or not these schemes are deployed. Second, neither our attacks nor our proposed correctness properties in any way imply that BGP fails to meet its current design specification. Our correctness properties are properties that we believe BGP ought to satisfy. The value of formalizing these properties is that it forces us to reckon that BGP does not even satisfy these surprisingly weak properties relating to its two core functions-ensuring reachability and enabling ASes to pick routes according to their policies. We believe that formalizing these properties and presenting a modified design and implementation that does provably achieve them (as we do in this paper) enables the IETF community to make a more informed choice on whether and how to incorporate these properties in the design specification of BGP in the future.
A summary of our contributions is as follows. 1) We formalize two basic properties, eventual reachability and policy prevalence, for BGP's control plane (Section III) and show that BGP fails to satisfy them in the presence of even a single malicious AS (Section IV) . 2) We demonstrate the feasibility of these attacks using commodity routers (Section V), and derive sufficient conditions to commit these attacks despite unpredictable propagation delays as under realistic network conditions (Section VI). 3) We experimentally show using the Internet's AS topology that strategically positioned attackers can potentially disconnect thousands of ASes from thousands of other ASes (Section VII). 4) We design and implement simple modifications to BGP that can provably ensure eventual reachability and policy prevalence and experimentally show their effectiveness (Section VIII). We begin with a brief overview of mechanisms in BGP to improve stability and messaging overhead.
II. BGP MECHANISMS TO IMPROVE STABILITY
BGP is a decentralized routing protocol. Whenever a router's best route changes, it announces an update message to its neighbors. If the changes happen too frequently, they can cause prohibitively high global message overhead. BGP implements two mechanisms to reduce the frequency of routing changes. The first mechanism is Route Flap Damping (RFD) to suppress a route when it changes often. The second mechanism is Minimum Route Advertisement Timer (MRAI) that ensures that the time interval between consecutive updates is large enough so as to prevent BGP's otherwise super-exponential message complexity. We explain these in detail next.
A. Routing Flap Damping (RFD)
RFD is a mechanism designed to discourage the selection of unstable routes. According to RFC 2439 [34] , each router maintains a penalty associated with every route announced by neighbors. The penalty measures the instability of a route. Whenever a route is withdrawn, the route's penalty is increased by a fixed value. If the penalty of the route exceeds the cut-off threshold, the route cannot be used for selecting the best route, i.e., the route gets damped. The penalty value decays exponentially over time according to (1) where and are the penalty at time and respectively, where , and is the decay parameter. Normally the amount of time needed for the penalty to decrease by half is used to indicate the decay speed, and the time is called the half-life parameter, represented by . Given can be calculated using . A route should be unsuppressed only if the penalty falls below the reuse threshold. To avoid over punishing a stable route, if a route has been stable for longer than the max-suppress-time, it will not be damped no matter how unstable it had been earlier.
We illustrate how RFD works in Fig. 1 . At time , the route gets flapped. When the penalty exceeds the cut-off threshold at , the route is damped, and when the penalty decays to the reuse threshold at , the route is reused.
Although RFD is still used to improve the overall stability of the Internet routing and reduce routing overhead, there has been considerable debate on the best practices on their deployment. For example, RFD can over-penalize some routes [23] , especially routes from well-connected ASes [27] , as these ASes' rich connections tend to amplify the number of update messages exchanged. Since the original RFC 2439 on RFD in 1998, a number of revisions have been proposed [4] , [6] , [27] including a recommendation by the RIPE Routing Working Group back in 2006 (RIPE-378 [5] ) to disable RFD altogether. A more recent recommendation in 2013 (RIPE-580) [6] , based on the observation that a small fraction of prefixes originate a significant fraction of routing updates, advocates significantly increasing the cutoff threshold to alleviate over-suppression during normal convergence. Among operators, RFD appears to considered less critical these days (perhaps because modern routers are less burdened by processing updates associated with route flaps), e.g., a recent 2012 survey [7] of 62 network operators and engineers showed that only 13 of them use RFD.
Our works brings a security perspective to inform this ongoing debate. In particular, we show using the Internet's AS-level topology that even if only a fraction of routers deploy RFD, possibly with different parameter settings, our identified attacks are feasible. In fact, some partial deployment scenarios can exacerbate the impact of the attack resulting in more potential victim ASes (Section VII(A)). We also show that simple variants of RFC 2439 including those implemented in commodity Cisco routers (Section V) as well as per-path vs. per-neighbor RFD do not suffice to eliminate these attacks.
B. Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI)
MRAI is the minimum amount of time that must pass between consecutive announcements of a route [28] . It limits the frequency of route announcements sent to neighbors. In a recently published BGP4 protocol specification [29] , withdrawals are also suggested to be limited by the MRAI timer. This suggestion departs from the previous BGP protocol specification [28] where withdrawals can be sent without waiting for the expiration of MRAI timer. We will show that, this change that has already been adopted by some commodity routers, exposes routers to MRAI attacks, and can cause permanent loss of connections.
III. PROTOCOL VULNERABILITIES IN BGP

A. Model and Assumptions
We focus on control plane security vulnerabilities in BGP in the presence of one or more compromised or bad ASes. Our threat model assumes that bad ASes can behave in a byzantine manner, i.e., they can deviate from the protocol in arbitrary, malicious ways. The rest of the ASes are by definition good, i.e., they strictly follow the protocol. Although bad ASes can behave in an arbitrary manner, we assume that they can not subvert standard cryptographic assumptions, i.e., they can not revert one-way hash functions or digitally sign messages on behalf of good ASes.
We further assume that the control plane is secured by authentication and integrity mechanisms such as those in SBGP [18] . As a result, ASes can only initiate route announcements for prefixes they own and prefix ownership is certified by a common certification authority. Furthermore, each route announcement (an AS path vector) carries with it proof that each AS along the route announced the corresponding prefix of the route. Likewise, an AS can verify if a route withdrawal was indeed issued by the immediately downstream AS. Good ASes only process verifiable updates and discard unverifiable updates immediately.
Our focus on control plane attacks means that data plane attacks (such as dropping, delaying, spoofing, or incorrectly forwarding data packets) are outside the scope of this paper. Although protection against data plane attacks is necessary for end-to-end security, our position is that securing the control plane alone is an important intermediate goal, a position that is consistent with a long line of work in BGP security [18] , [19] , [25] , [36] but is by no means a universally accepted position [35] .
The restrictions on the behavior of malicious ASes as described above may naturally lead one to wonder what kind of egregious deviations from the protocol if any are possible. Essentially, a bad AS can announce or withdraw (verifiable) routes at whim, for example, even when no link or node failures or policy changes on part of other ASes occur. We show that even this restricted behavior on part of bad ASes can have serious consequences for good ASes.
B. Desirable Properties 1) Definitions:
A route is a sequence of distinct ASes to a destination prefix. 1 A good route is a route consisting of only good ASes. A bad route is a route consisting of at least one bad AS. (Good and bad are as defined above.)
The network is said to be in steady-state when (1) no further link or node failures occur and (2) good ASes do not make any further changes to their routing policies. It should be clear from the definition that in steady-state, only bad ASes can initiate routing events. Although good ASes can never initiate routing events in steady-state, they can make routing changes as a reaction to those routing events triggered by bad ASes. Unless otherwise stated, all properties discussed in this paper assume that the network is in steady-state. We need this assumption only to simplify the definitions of the properties, not for conducting the attacks.
A policy-compliant route to a prefix is recursively defined as follows. A route adopted by a router is policy-compliant either if (1) the route is a single-hop route directly connecting the router to the destination, or (2) the next-hop (downstream) router along the route has adopted a policy-compliant route to the destination and the next-hop router's policy makes it willing to route traffic destined for that prefix from the (upstream) router via its currently adopted route. As above, policy-compliance is just a definition and does not mean that ASes have to be aware of the routing policies of other ASes.
A prefix is said to be reachable at a router if the router has currently adopted a policy-compliant route to the prefix. Otherwise, the prefix is unreachable. Note that if we assume zero propagation delays and no failures, packets forwarded by a router along an adopted policy-compliant route are guaranteed to immediately arrive at the destination. So, although strictly speaking we focus only on control-plane properties in this paper, the definition of reachable does attempt to capture the common notion of forwarding plane reachability.
2) Eventual Reachability: A fundamental goal of BGP is to enable reachability in a policy-compliant manner. We informally state a natural property that one might expect BGP to satisfy: If at least one policy-compliant, good route to a destination exists, the destination should be reachable. In order to assess if or how well BGP satisfies this property, we need to state this property more formally. To this end, we introduce the notion of a good AS-subgraph below. Let denote the AS-level multigraph whose nodes are the set of all ASes and edges correspond to interconnections between pairs of adjacent ASes. Let denote the subgraph of obtained by removing all bad nodes as well as all edges adjacent to those bad nodes. We refer to as the good subgraph of or simply as the good AS-subgraph. We refer to as the original AS-graph.
By definition, the routing policies of routers in the good AS-subgraph are identical to their corresponding policies in the original AS-graph except for policies involving bad routes (that are simply unavailable in the good AS-subgraph). Thus, if and are two policy-compliant, good routes to a destination from a router such that prefers over in the original AS-graph, then prefers over in the good AS-subgraph as well. Similarly export policies involving only good ASes are identical in the original AS-graph and the good AS-subgraph. For example, if an AS A chooses to not announce a route via one provider B to another provider C (because of the valley-free routing policy) in the original AS-graph and all three ASes A, B, and C are good, then A will not announce a route via B to C in the good AS-subgraph as well.
Property 1. (Eventual Reachability):
If a destination is reachable in steady-state in the good AS-subgraph, then it must be eventually reachable in the original AS graph.
Eventual reachability is a weak property since it only requires the destination to be reachable eventually, or equivalently not find the destination permanently unreachable. Thus, if there exists even a vanishing instant of time when the destination is reachable, the property is satisfied. We show that the current BGP can not even satisfy this weak property with malicious ASes. 3) Policy Prevalence: BGP is designed to enable ASes to pick their most preferred route to a prefix when multiple choices are available. So, malicious ASes must not be able to force a router to consistently select a less-preferred route from a set of policy-compliant, good routes. Property 2 below captures this requirement.
Property 2. (Policy Prevalence):
If two or more policy-compliant, good routes to a destination always exist at a router in steady state, the destination must be reachable via a route that is at least as preferred as the most preferred of those routes.
Although the above formal definitions may seem "obviously" true or like an overkill of formalism, we show that they are easily violated by attackers. The point of formalizing these properties is to convince ourselves that these are indeed security breaches, i.e., violations of intrinsically desirable properties, not just eccentric but normal BGP behavior.
IV. ATTACK MECHANISMS
In this section, we show that BGP does not satisfy either of the properties introduced in the previous section. To this end, we present several simple example scenarios in which bad nodes execute a sequence of actions so as to violate the properties. All of the examples involve a single destination prefix to which all ASes attempt to establish a route, as routes to different prefixes are computed independently by BGP. For simplicity of exposition, the examples in this section assume that each AS consists of a single router, and RFD is implemented as the recommendations in RFC 2439. In Sections V and VI, we will show that our mechanisms work well in much more general settings, including the settings in commodity routers.
A. Attacks Violating Eventual Reachability (ER)
We show two different examples of attacks that can violate ER below, one in which the malicious AS abuses the RFD and another in which it abuses the MRAI timer.
Example 1 Violating ER Using RFD: Example 1 shows how an attacker can abuse RFD to violate ER. Consider the topology shown in Fig. 2 . Node 1 has three routes to reach , and . Node 1's preference order is . The malicious node 2 controls the two most preferred routes and . is good. We suppose RFD and MRAI use the settings recommended in RFC 2439 and RFC 1771 respectively. That is: (1) RFD penalty is associated with every route, and (2) only withdrawals count towards the RFD penalty, and (3) MRAI is applied on announcements only, i.e., withdrawals are propagated immediately. We also assume that RFD is enabled on node 1 and node with the same parameters. These assumptions are made for simplicity of exposition. Subsequently, we will show at the end of the example that the attack can be mounted even without these assumptions.
The attack works by forcing node to keep the good route damped forever. The attack is mounted in two stages. In the first stage, node 2 forces to be flapped until it is damped by node . In the second stage, node 2 forces 's penalty value to be consistently above the reuse threshold so that it remains damped forever. Stage 1 involves node 2 making the following sequence of announcements and withdrawals.
Stage 1:
• (Step 1) : Announce to node 6.
• (Step 2) : Withdraw to node 6. • (Step 3) : Announce to node 3.
• (Step 4)
: Withdraw to node 3.
Repeat steps 1-4 until
Step when is damped. Fig. 4 illustrates why the above sequence of steps result in node damping . When node 2 announces to node 6, node 1 withdraws and announces to node . From 's perspective, and get one announcement and one withdrawal respectively. Similarly, when node 2 withdraws from node 6, node 1 withdraws and announces instead. From node x's perspective, and get one withdrawal and one announcement respectively. Thus, by this point gets one withdrawal for both and . A similar sequence of flaps happens when node 2 announces and withdraws to node 3. Thus, after is withdrawn, 's withdrawal counter for has reached 2 while its counter for both and is 1. By construction, it should be clear that 's penalty grows at twice the rate of or , so will eventually damp but and will remain undamped at that point.
Let denote the length of time since 's penalty for exceeds the cut-off threshold until it decays back to the reuse threshold. During this period, node 2 does not announce either or . Thus, will find unreachable for the duration of length when remains damped.
Stage 1 above shows that an attacker can force a destination to become unreachable for a victim AS for a finite length of time . Next, we extend the attack to make the destination unreachable forever, thereby violating ER. This stage, referred to as stage 2, is shown below. Stage 2 begins at time that denotes the first time when 's penalty decays to the reuse threshold. The parameter below refers to the time it takes for the penalty to decay back to the reuse threshold after one withdrawal has pushed it above the reuse threshold. The step index is a nonnegative integer.
Stage 2:
• (Step 1) : Announce to node 6 and withdraw it immediately after. • (Step 2) : Announce to node 3 and withdraw it immediately after.
• : Repeat step 1.
• : Repeat step 2.
As shown in Fig. 4 , stage 2 causes 's penalty to remain above the reuse threshold. The highest penalty can reach during the stage 2 is one withdrawal penalty above the reuse threshold. Since normally at least two back to back withdrawals are needed for penalty to increase from the reuse threshold to the cut-off threshold, 's penalty is always below the cut-off threshold. Because the penalty of and are always smaller than the penalty on and can never reach the cut-off threshold. Throughout the stage 2, remains damped and neither nor is available to , so the destination remains unreachable to forever, thereby violating ER.
We note that the attacks described above are serious and can not be prevented with simple modifications to RFD or MRAI or changes to their parameters. A naive solution may be to allow an AS to reuse an unstable route if no other route exists. However, this solution allows the attacker to arbitrarily flap routes if it controls the only route, and can cause unacceptable global update flooding, contradicting the purpose of RFD.
The attacks above work even without the assumptions we made in order to explain the strategy. First, if RFD is enabled on node 1 and node with different cut-off thresholds, the attack strategy can still violate ER. If node 1's cut-off threshold is higher, the attack works obviously. If node 1's cut-off threshold is lower, we only need the attacker to control more preferred routes of node 1, and the strategy is still valid. Second, if MRAI is applied to both announcements and withdrawals as recommended in RFC 4271, the attack still violates ER. In this case, node 6 (node 3) will not immediately propagate the withdrawal for , so may continue to adopt the route for an MRAI interval, however the adopted route is not policy-compliant as node 6 (node 3) has locally withdrawn the route, so the destination is still unreachable. Third, if RFD penalty is associated with peers instead of routes, node 1 will trigger more penalty on node than node 3 or node 6 does on node 1. Thus, node 1 will be damped by , and ER is still violated. We will analyze more variations below.
Example 2 Violating Eventual Reachability Using MRAI: Consider the topology in Fig. 3 . Node has three routes to reach and . Node prefers and to . By virtue of its position, the attacker node 2 controls and . is a good route. We assume that the MRAI timer is in use and is applied to both announcements and withdrawals as recommended in RFC 4271 [29] . We also assume that the RFD timer is disabled on Node 1, 3 and .
The attack involves the malicious node 2 making a sequence of announcements and withdrawals that result in becoming permanently unavailable to . The sequence of steps and the timing are listed below, where is an arbitrary starting time, refers to one MRAI interval (typically 30 seconds [28] , [29] ), and the step index is a nonnegative integer.
• (Step 1) : Announce to node 1 and withdraw it immediately after. • (Step 2) : Announce to node 3 and withdraw it immediately after.
• : Repeat step 2. Next, we show why the above sequence of steps causes to become unreachable to . Fig. 5 illustrates the resulting events at nodes and 2. Each time node 2 announces a route, say to node 1, and withdraws it immediately, only the announcement is propagated right away, and the withdrawal is delayed for one MRAI. During this time, node continues to adopt the route even though it is not policy-compliant (and any packets forwarded by along will get dropped at node 1). When the withdrawal for arrives at node , it is followed immediately by an announcement for but the corresponding withdrawal is delayed by an MRAI. As before, node will switch to , which is not policy-compliant rendering unreachable. Note that because RFD is assumed disabled, and never get damped. As a result, finds unreachable forever even though the route exists throughout.
B. Attacks Violating Policy Prevalence
Example 3 Violating Policy Prevalence: Example 1 can be easily extended so as to violate the policy prevalence property. Consider the same topology as in Fig. 2 , but with one additional good route from node to destination . Suppose prefers over . With the strategy outlined in Example 1, node per- petually adopts to destination instead of the more preferred good route (as remains damped forever), thereby violating the policy prevalence property. Note that, with BGPsec or alike security measures, even though policy prevalence is violated, the selected path is still legitimate. a) Discussion: All of the attack examples presented above require the attacker to be on the most preferred route. So it is natural to wonder why these attacks are worrisome given that the attacker can simply drop or reroute the victim's packets in the data plane? There are several reasons for this. First, ASes can detect data plane misbehavior using existing techniques to verify consistency between control plane and data plane actions and react in the event of inconsistencies [17] , [33] , [37] . However, in the control plane manipulation attacks presented above, the attacker does not violate any specification of "correct" protocol behavior (such as saying one thing and doing another), so it is more difficult to thwart these attacks. Second, protocol manipulation attacks exist irrespective of whether or not data plane verification mechanisms are deployed, so BGP remains insecure unless these attacks are systematically addressed. Third, and most importantly, an attacker can use these attacks to impact routes that it does not directly control, e.g., the attack violating policy prevalence can force an AS to adopt a provider route over a peer route (in violation of typical AS preferences) even though the attacker is on neither of those two paths. The ability to launch such "indirect" attacks makes them significantly more problematic than data plane attacks.
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
The attacks described "on paper" in the previous section naturally raise the question: Are realistic router implementations vulnerable to these attacks and if so, to what extent? To answer this question, we present experiments involving a commodity Cisco router as well as Quagga software routers that confirm the serious nature of these attacks. Below, we first describe differences between the RFC and commodity router implementations. We then experimentally show that the high-level attack strategies described above are successful despite implementation differences between different routers.
A. Implementation in Commodity Routers
Commodity routers implement RFD differently from RFC 2439. The RFC suggests that RFD penalty should be maintained on a per-route basis. However, per-route penalty counters incur nontrivial CPU and memory usage, so commercial routers commonly adopt a modified, lighter-weight method. Instead of maintaining penalty counters for each route, this method maintains a single penalty for all routes to the same destination from a neighbor AS. A Cisco router maintains a penalty value for each peer and destination pair. If it receives an attribute change (a withdrawal) from a peer, it increases the peer's penalty value by 500 (1000). Whenever the accumulated penalty for a peer-destination pair exceeds the cut-off threshold, any route for the destination announced by the peer is damped. After the penalty decays to the reuse threshold, the peer's route can be reused. If an update is announced when the route remains damped, the state of the peer is recomputed using the following rules. After adding the penalty of the new update, if the value is below the cut-off threshold, the newly announced route should be used. Otherwise, the peer should remain damped. Note that, with this implementation, even though the peer's penalty is above the reuse threshold, its route can still be adopted. This phenomena is also observed by [38] .
B. Experiments With Commodity Routers
In this section, we present experiments using a commodity Cisco router (Cisco 3600) and Quagga software routers (modified to be consistent with the Cisco implementation) to show that malicious ASes can successfully commit our attacks. Although the Cisco router we use is an old model, its default timer settings are the same as the latest Cisco models. The experimental topologies are shown in Fig. 6 . We use each router to emulate a single-router AS, so we use router and AS interchangeably in this section. Routers labeled with numbers are Quagga routers, and router is a Cisco router. In all the experiments, AS is the victim AS, and AS 2 is the attacker, and the destination prefix is announced by AS 4. AS 1 is set to prefer any route announced by the attacker over other routes.
1) RFD Attacks:
We tailor the attack strategy shown in Example 1 in order to account for the specific settings in Cisco routers. First, the attacker must ensure every update in the second stage brings the penalty above the cut-off threshold instead of just the reuse threshold as Cisco settings in some cases allow a route to be used even if the penalty is above the reuse threshold (as explained in Section V-A above). However, this only means that the attacker must choose a smaller interval for sending successive updates. Below, we demonstrate attacks with a specific choice of these intervals. Section VI analyzes in the detail the range of intervals for which the attacks are successful. Second, it is unnecessary to send withdrawals immediately after the announcements in the second stage as in Example 1 (though the original strategy also works). This is because Cisco routers maintain per-peer penalties, so if a peer is damped all routes announced by the peer would be damped, which makes the attacker's job even easier.
An attacker controlling two paths can disrupt eventual reachability with Cisco settings. Our experimental topology is shown in Fig. 6(a) , and is similar to Example 1. The attack as before proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the attacker (AS 2) flaps its route with time interval min. After crosses the cut-off threshold, the attack enters the second stage, and the flap time interval is min. The actions of AS 2 are shown in Fig. 7(a) . The penalties maintained by ASes are shown in Fig. 8 . AS 1's penalties for AS 2 and AS 5 are roughly the same, so we only show one of them. The figure shows that in the second stage, every flap initiated by the attacker pushes AS 's penalty for AS 1 above the cut-off threshold, so AS 1 remains damped forever. Eventual reachability is violated even though the good route 1-3-6-7-5-d is available throughout.
If AS 1 disables RFD, an attacker flapping one route can disrupt eventual reachability with an even simpler vulnerable topology as shown in Fig. 6(b) . In this case, attacker AS 2 can flap its route every 1.5 min as shown in Fig. 7(b) . The penalty at AS is shown in Fig. 9 . Since RFD is disabled at AS 1, AS 2 can continue to flap the route, and AS 1 is damped forever by AS , thereby violating eventual reachability.
2) MRAI Attacks: We demonstrate two experiments for MRAI attacks with an attacker controlling two and one most preferred route respectively. We modify Quagga software routers so that MRAI is applied to withdrawals as per the Cisco implementation. To commit a successful attack, the withdrawal message must be sent after the announcement is adopted by a victim AS. Thus, in both experiments, we attach a user level machine to the Cisco router, and use traceroute to figure out when the announcement is adopted.
The first experiment is conducted with the topology in Fig. 6(c) , where AS 2 controls two paths, and AS , 1 and 3 disable RFD. Fig. 10 shows the actions of AS 2. represents the time from when AS 2 sends an announcement (withdrawal) to when the announcement (withdrawal) is adopted by AS . By issuing consecutive ping messages, we record when the route between and 4 is down. Fig. 12 shows the result. Even though the attack was designed to theoretically violate eventual reachability, it only makes the destination unreachable for 88% of time in this experiment. That is because there exists a period of time between when an announcement is sent by the attacker and when the announcement is adopted by , and during this time interval, the good route is used to reach the destination. Nevertheless, the small fraction of reachable time is sufficiently worrisome in practice.
It is possible to conduct an MRAI attack even if the attacker controls just one route. The vulnerable topology is shown in Fig. 6(d) where RFD is disabled on AS 1 and AS . The actions of AS 2 are shown in Fig. 11 . and represent the time from when AS 2 sends an update to the time when the update is adopted by AS . Fig. 13 shows the connectivity between AS and AS 4 under one route attacks. The destination is unreachable for 45% of the time.
VI. GENERALIZING ATTACK SCENARIOS
The previous sections demonstrated our attacks work for the simple example topologies using hand-picked inter-update intervals. In this section, we discuss sufficient conditions for a successful RFD or MRAI attack in general scenarios.
A. Sufficient Conditions for RFD Attacks
We first describe sufficient conditions for a topology to be vulnerable to RFD attacks, and then describe sufficient conditions for an attacker to select inter-update intervals under realistic network propagation delays.
1) RFD-Vulnerable Topologies:
We introduce the notion of an RFD-vulnerable topology, a straightforward generalization of the topology in Example 1. An RFD-vulnerable topology is defined as one where an attacker, victim, and destination satisfy the following properties: (1) the attacker controls the two most preferred routes and there exists at least one good route from the victim to the destination; (2) the two most preferred (bad) routes and the most preferred good route from the victim to the destination share a common AS that is upstream of the attacker along the two bad routes; (3) any AS that belongs to both of the two most preferred (bad) routes and is upstream of the attacker along those routes also belongs to the most preferred good route.
The definition of an RFD-vulnerable topology can be relaxed to include cases when the attacker controls just one route provided some ASes disable RFD. The corresponding properties are: (1) the attacker is part of the most preferred route and there exists at least one good route from the victim to the destination; (2) a common AS is immediately downstream of the victim along the most preferred (bad) route as well as the most preferred good route; (3) ASes upstream of the attacker along the most preferred (bad) route up until and including the first AS that also belongs to the most preferred good route, disable RFD.
In an RFD-vulnerable topology of either kind above, we refer to as pre-attacker ASes those ASes that are upstream of the attacker along the (two) most preferred bad route(s) up until and including the first AS that belongs to both of the two most preferred routes. The pre-attacker AS that is the furthest from the attacker is referred to as the last pre-attacker AS. Any ASes between the victim AS (inclusive) and the last pre-attacker AS (exclusive) are called sensitive ASes.
2) Selecting Inter-Update Intervals: Next, we derive sufficient conditions to select the inter-update intervals so as to ensure that an RFD attack is successful despite unpredictable propagation delays as under realistic network conditions. Propagation delays 2 may be difficult to predict because of several reasons including route changes, queuing delays, and protocol timers. For example, different routers may be configured with different values of MRAI timers and a given update may face any fraction of the timer at each hop. For example, an update may be delayed at each AS along the propagation path by any value between 0 and , where and are the inter-AS and intra-AS timers respectively (assuming that the update experiences just one intra-AS MRAI within an AS, as would be the case with a full-mesh configuration).
a) All Pre-Attacker ASes Disable RFD: We first consider the case where pre-attacker ASes disable RFD in a vulnerable topology (as defined in Section VI-A1). The attack strategy is the single-route RFD attack as shown in Fig. 7(b) . Let as the time interval between two consecutive flaps by the attacker, and as the longest propagation delay from the attacker to the RFD victim AS respectively. Thus, the time interval between two flaps at the RFD victim AS can be between and . To make sure each flap can reach the victim AS, should satisfy:
. In order to make the penalty on the victim AS larger than the cut-off threshold , the largest penalty decay possible on the RFD victim AS between two consecutive flaps must be smaller than one flap penalty, . As the decay is an increasing function of the original penalty value, the attack will succeed if satisfies . Thus,
We have the following proposition (with a more formal proof of all claims above in [30] ).
Proposition 1:
In an RFD-vulnerable topology, if the pre-attacker ASes disable RFD and at least one of the sensitive ASes enables RFD, then the attacker can violate eventual reachability or policy prevalence using the single-route RFD attack by choosing an inter-flap interval such that . If default Cisco settings are used, to violate ER and PP, needs to satisfy minutes. In order to find a valid , Proposition 1 implicitly requires the longest propagation delay to satisfy . That is, only if , then the RFD attack is guaranteed to be successful. With default Cisco setting, has to be smaller than 3.11 mins. The longest propagation delay between two ASes is about 35 secs (30 secs for inter-AS MRAI timer and 5 secs for intra-AS MRAI timer), so the time ensures that an attacker can attack a victim AS about 6 AS hops away.
b) At Least One Pre-Attacker AS Enables RFD:
We next consider the case when at least one of the pre-attacker ASes enables RFD in an RFD-vulnerable topology. In this case, the attacker must control the two most preferred paths in order to commit the attack. Similar to the two-stage attack shown in Fig. 7(a) , the attacker can periodically flap the route to the destination to violate eventual reachability or policy prevalence. Let and denote the inter-flap intervals during the first and second stage respectively.
To make the penalty at the victim AS go over the cut-off threshold in the first stage, still needs to be small enough to satisfy the condition in (2) above. However, we also need to be large enough so that the penalty on the pre-attacker ASes is below the cut-off threshold (otherwise the malicious routes will be damped by the pre-attacker ASes downstream of the victim causing the attacker to lose control). The resulting condition that must satisfy is as follows.
For all such that (3) where . To maintain the damping forever at the victim AS in the second stage, the interval should be sufficiently small, i.e., should satisfy the condition in (2) . At the same time, should also be large enough so that the highest penalty possible on pre-attacker ASes does not cross the cut-off threshold. So, in addition to (2) , should satisfy the following condition. (4) Thus, we have the following proposition (with a formal proof of all claims above in [30] ).
Proposition 2:
In an RFD-vulnerable topology, if one of the sensitive ASes enables RFD, then an attacker can violate eventual reachability or policy prevalence using the two-route RFD attack if satisfies (2) and (3), and satisfies (2) and (4).
With default Cisco settings, and should satisfy minutes and minutes respectively. In order to find valid and , Proposition 2 implicitly requires to satisfy . That is, if the longest propagation delay between an attacker and a victim is less than , the attacker can guarantee to commit a successful RFD attack. With default Cisco settings, has to be smaller than 1.23 mins. The time ensures an attacker to reach a victim AS two AS hops away.
B. Sufficient Conditions for MRAI Attacks
We first describe sufficient conditions for a topology to be vulnerable to MRAI attacks. We define an MRAI-vulnerable topology, a straightforward generalization of Example 2, as one where an attacker, victim, and destination satisfy the following properties: (1) the attacker controls the two most preferred routes from the victim to the destination; (2) on each of the two most preferred routes from the victim to the destination, there exists a pre-attacker AS, i.e., an AS located upstream of the attacker on that route (but not the other route) such that all possible routes from that AS to the destination include the attacker; (3) there exists a pre-attacker AS on each route that applies MRAI to both announcements and withdrawals.
It is straightforward to show that in any MRAI-vulnerable topology, an attacker can employ an attack similar to that in Example 2 so as to make the destination unreachable to the victim for some fraction of the time. However, as MRAI attacks are more sensitive to timing than RFD attacks, we are unable to state credible (i.e., practically achievable) sufficient conditions for an attacker to guarantee that MRAI attacks violate eventual reachability, i.e., make the destination perpetually unreachable to the victim. If the attacker has no information about the MRAI timer values of pre-attacker ASes, the attack is unlikely to make a destination perpetually unreachable.
To appreciate the above claim, consider the scenario in Fig. 6(d) . Suppose the time interval between an announcement and a withdrawal is and there is time left in AS 1's MRAI timer at the time AS 1 receives the announcement. Note that , where and are the inter and intra AS timer in AS 1. If the attacker chooses , then the announcement will not be propagated upstream by AS 1 if as the correspond withdrawal would have already arrived by the time the MRAI timer expires. In this case, the victim will simply adopt the alternate good route. If the attacker chooses , then the withdrawal would be propagated by AS 1 immediately if . In this case, the victim will find the destination unreachable only for a short duration when the withdrawal is under propagation.
The key to make the MRAI attack effective in practice is to ensure MRAI victim AS receives and adopts the announcement just before the withdrawal is sent by the attacker. To this end, the attacker can deploy a user-level machine in the MRAI victim AS to monitor when the announcement is adopted. As shown in the MRAI experiments in the previous section, although this strategy does not violate eventual reachability, it can make a destination unreachable to the victim for a significant fraction of the time.
Compared to RFD attacks, MRAI attacks are weaker because of three other reasons. First, MRAI attacks are unlikely to cause persistent unreachability in practice. Second, MRAI attacks can not violate policy prevalence as, unlike RFD attacks, they do not disable any good route. Third, if all ASes apply MRAI timers only to announcements and not to withdrawals (as was specified by an older, outdated RFC for non-security reasons), then they can not be abused to cause reachability attacks like the ones described in this paper.
VII. VULNERABILITY OF THE INTERNET
In this section, we study the extent to which the Internet is vulnerable to RFD and MRAI attacks, and the topological characteristics of ASes that are particularly vulnerable or those that make for powerful attackers.
Our high-level methodology is to search for RFD-or MRAI-vulnerable structures in the Internet's AS-level topology that we construct using BGP tables collected from the Routeviews [8] and RIPE RIS projects [3] . In order to identify vulnerable topologies, we need to know ASes' routing policies that are usually private. However, it is commonly believed that routing decisions largely depend on commercial peering relationships with ties being broken by selecting shorter routes over the longer ones. Our experiments incorporate these assumptions, and the relationships between ASes are inferred using the algorithm proposed in [14] . 
A. Number of Victim ASes
We first analyze the number of potential victim ASes in the Internet. For each destination-attacker pair (referred to as an attack pair), we compute the number of vulnerable structures to which they belong and identify the corresponding victims. Because of the compute-intensive nature of this search, we only consider attackers that are on the best route of more than 20 ASes in RFD attacks and more than 1000 in MRAI attacks.
In the RFD attack experiment, we consider two cases. In case 1, we assume that all the ASes in the Internet enable RFD with the same parameters, and in case 2, we assume that the pre-attacker ASes in each vulnerable topology disable RFD. Fig. 14(a) shows that, in case 1, there are more than and destination-attacker pairs, which can make at least one victim AS violate eventual reachability and policy prevalence, respectively. The corresponding numbers for case 2 are and pairs. This result shows that with some of the ASes disabling RFD, more ASes can become victims.
In the MRAI attack experiment, we assume that ASes apply the MRAI timer to both announcements and withdrawals. There are a total of attack pairs, which can make the destination unreachable to at least one victim AS for a fraction of the time. The fraction of time the victim finds the destination unavailable depends upon the number of paths controlled by the attacker, the nature of propagation delays, and updates sent by other ASes. We are unable to quantify the fraction of unreachability for the MRAI-vulnerable structures identified in the Internet, but note that this fraction can be significant, especially for small vulnerable structures as shown experimentally in Section V-B2.
B. Vulnerability of Popular Destinations
We evaluate how vulnerable popular destinations are to reachability attacks. We choose the ASes from top 14 websites and two popular CDNs 3 ranked by [10] as the destinations, and compute how many of these ASes can become unreachable if any AS can launch RFD or MRAI attacks. Note that, we only focus on the reachability of the ASes belonging to these content providers rather than the content itself. Content providers usually have multiple copies of content, so the unreachability of the ASes does not necessarily mean the unreachability of the content, but only that specific copies may be rendered unavailable. We compute the number of victim ASes assuming that (1) pre-attacker ASes disable RFD in the RFD-vulnerable topologies discovered; and (2) MRAI timers are applied to both announcements and withdrawals. Fig. 15 shows that the RFD attack can cause 24032 ASes (or 60.3%) to find at least one of these ASes persistently unreachable, while MRAI attacks can cause 18576 ASes (or 46.6%) to find at least one of these ASes intermittently unreachable.
We also conducted experiments to assess the characteristics of ASes that make them particularly vulnerable or powerful attackers (deferred to [30] ). Our main findings are that under RFD attacks, ASes with a small degree are more vulnerable and ASes with a high degree make for powerful attackers. However, MRAI attacks do not exhibit such a correlation.
VIII. ADDRESSING BGP'S VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we describe simple modifications to BGP in order to achieve the two properties-eventual reachability and policy prevalence-despite the presence of malicious nodes. The two key mechanisms we introduce to accomplish this goal are secure root cause information and route stabilization.
A. Why Root Cause Information?
A naive approach to prevent the proposed attacks would be to simply disable RFD and MRAI timers in BGP. Indeed, disabling them suffices to achieve eventual reachability and policy prevalence (that as defined are rather weak properties), but introduces more serious problems. Without these timers, attackers can arbitrarily increase route fluctuations and messaging overhead in BGP. Even under benign conditions, it is well known that disabling MRAI timers can result in a super-exponential message complexity in BGP [21] . A practical solution must preserve the benefits of these mechanisms while limiting the impact of the vulnerabilities they introduce.
Our key insight based on the attack scenarios presented earlier is that the vulnerabilities exist because good ASes do not have enough visibility into the root cause of an update. This allows attackers to implicate good upstream ASes or good routes passing through those ASes in the eyes of ASes further upstream. To address this problem, we propose to include root cause information in each route update message. The idea of using root cause information itself is not new, e.g., it has been proposed in [22] , [26] to improve BGP convergence time by reducing number of update messages and intermediate route changes before convergence; and in [20] to prevent routing loops during convergence. In contrast to these works, we use an RCI-based scheme to defend against security vulnerabilities.
B. Secure Root Cause Information (SRCI)
We determine the root cause of an update as follows. If the update is the result of a router or link failure, the root cause AS is the AS that owns (in case of intra-AS failures) or directly connects with (in case of inter-AS failures) the router or link; the resulting update issued by that AS includes itself as the root cause AS. If the update is a result of a local policy change at a router (i.e., one that is not caused by the receipt of an update from a neighboring router), the root cause AS is the AS to which the router belongs.
Our proposed secure root cause information (SRCI) mechanism works as follows. When an update is initialized by a router in response to a local failure or policy change, the router includes an SRCI message. The SRCI message contains three fields. The first field is the AS number of the "root cause" AS. The second field is a timestamp to show when the update is initialized. The third field is the destination prefix. Any router that issues an update in response to an update received from a neighboring router retains the same SRCI message as in the received causal update.
The SRCI message is verifiable, i.e., any AS receiving an update can verify that the root cause AS is indeed the one contained in the received update. Under BGPSec, every router is assigned a verified router ID and a certified public key by the AS that owns the router. Let denote the corresponding private key. Whenever router initializes an update , it includes a signed SRCI message computed as follows. Let the root cause AS, the timestamp field and the destination prefix be denoted as and respectively. Then the SRCI message , where " " represents concatenation and means that the message is signed using key . The initiating router includes in the update and is retained in any upstream updates caused by .
Upon receiving the update, a router verifies the SRCI as follows. First, the router verifies that is indeed signed by router using the public key . Then, the router verifies if the root cause AS is indeed the AS to which belongs. Next, the router verifies that the timestamp is greater than or equal to all previously initiated updates from router . Finally, the router verifies that the update it receives has the same destination prefix as the one in the SRCI. If any of these checks fail, the router discards the update. If a router receives an update without an RCI message from a neighbor, the router identifies the neighbor as a malicious and discards the update.
SRCI messages should be cleaned up when the prefix it is associated with is stable. When the penalty of a prefix decays to 0, then all the SRCI messages for the prefix should be deleted.
The RFD procedure modified using SRCI is as follows. A router increases the penalty value for a route iff it receives an update (an announcement or withdrawal) for the route with a current timestamp and with the root cause AS in the route. All good routers must implement RFD with the same parameters.
With SRCI, we have the following lemma (with a formal proof in [30] ):
Lemma 1: In steady state, with RFD with SRCI, a good route can never get damped.
Lemma 1 ensures policy prevalence. This is simply because if a good route can never get damped, and two or more policycompliant, good routes to a destination always exist at a router, the router will either choose the most preferred of those good routes or choose an even more preferred route if available.
Note that SRCI as defined above is designed only to ensure that a good route is never damped. It does not ensure that a route containing a misbehaving bad AS will get damped. This is because bad ASes can potentially reuse timestamps from the most recent routing event that they or other downstream ASes may have initiated. Thus, with SRCI alone, it is possible for bad ASes to cause nontrivial route flux and message overhead. Exactly tracking the number of root cause events initiated by an AS incurs significant overhead at each AS (commensurate to the size and number of propagation paths each update can traverse). Furthermore, damping fluctuating routes or ASes alone is insufficient to ensure eventual reachability. To address these problems, we introduce an additional mechanism called route stabilization as described next.
C. Route Stabilization
Although it may appear that Lemma 1 suffices to ensure eventual reachability, a rather weak property, that is unfortunately not the case (or at least we are unable to formally prove it). The reason is that, although SRCI prevents good routes from being damped, it is not sufficient to ensure that a good router eventually adopts a policy-compliant route (refer Section III-B1), i.e., it finds the destination reachable. For example, if routing never stabilizes, as could be the case with policy preferences involving dispute wheels [16] , it is possible that a good router forever keeps adopting routes resulting in forwarding loops or blackholes. So, to ensure eventual reachability, we introduce another mechanism called route stabilization that ensures that every router always eventually adopts a consistent, policy-compliant route (good or bad).
Route stabilization does not require any coordination between routers and works as follows. Each router demarcates its actions corresponding to each destination into epochs. If more than a threshold time has elapsed since the beginning of the current epoch and the router has not adopted any route that has remained stable for at least a threshold time in the current epoch, the router switches to a different route if one is available in round robin order. If the currently adopted route has remained stable for time , that marks the end of the current epoch and the beginning of the next. The time can be any value (setting it to infinity is equivalent to disabling route stabilization, while setting it to a smaller values intermittently prioritizes stable routes over the router's default policy preferences), but it is critical that where is the length of the longest possible AS path and is the longest time that each AS can hold an update. Essentially, route stabilization prioritizes stable routes over flappy routes, but unlike RFD that only damps flappy routes, route stabilization additionally selects stable routes proactively.
Putting all of the above together, we have the following theorem (with a formal proof in [30] ):
Theorem 1: If RFD is implemented with SRCI and route stabilization and MRAI is implemented for announcements only, BGP satisfies eventual reachability and policy prevalence. a) Discussion: We note that the two mechanisms-RFD with SRCI and route stabilization-have overlapping goals and can co-exist. We introduced the former in order to provably ensure policy prevalence and the latter to provably ensure eventual reachability. Nevertheless, route stabilization alone (without any form of RFD) is sufficient to ensure both eventual reachability and policy preference (as simply disabling all RFD ensures policy prevalence). We have described the two mechanisms separately partly for ease of exposition and partly out of a few practical considerations as follows.
First, network operators today have experience with RFD and may be unwilling to switch to a new mechanism to stabilize routes-augmenting RFD with SRCI is simple and preserves the essential behavior of BGP when all ASes are good. Second, although route stabilization is needed to ensure eventual reachability in the presence of bad ASes, it can change the behavior of BGP even when all ASes are good. In general, even when all ASes are good, route stabilization can cause ASes to arrive at somewhat different routing decisions compared to vanilla BGP as benign link failures or policy changes can intermittently cause route stabilization to get invoked at some AS. Nevertheless, in steady state, BGP with or without route stabilization will behave identically when all ASes are good. Third, until all ASes have adopted route stabilization, any AS employing route stabilization must continue to also use SRCI to avoid being damped by other good ASes that continue to use RFD. All of these reasons make the case for ASes to use RFD with SRCI as well as route stabilization until all ASes have adopted route stabilization.
D. Experiments SRCI and Route Stabilization
Although a weak property like eventual reachability is critical, it is important in practice for a destination to be highly reachable. It is nontrivial to formally show a lower bound on the reachability achieved by our mechanisms (or for that matter BGP even with no malicious ASes). Nevertheless, we experimentally show that BGP with SRCI achieves a high level of reachability. To this end, we rerun the RFD attack experiments in Section V-B using Quagga routers with SRCI and route stabilization implemented (with and set to 6 minutes). By sending ping packets from the victim node to the destination every 0.2 second, we find no ping packets are lost, i.e., the destination is 100% reachable.
Interestingly, route stabilization can also improve reachability in benign unstable policy configurations. To show this, we experiment with a dispute wheel [16] structure where the routing is guaranteed to not stabilize. The topology is shown in Fig. 16 with each node's routing choices listed in the order of preference. With all nodes enabling (vanilla) RFD, nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 can achieve 99.8%, 99.8%, 99.7% and 71.1%-reachability respectively. The unreachability is caused by the loopy route that is formed during routing flaps and RFD damping. Note that, even though no router is malicious in this scenario, a good route can get intermittently damped making the destination unreachable. On the other hand, with RFD with SRCI and route stabilization ( minutes and minutes) implemented at each router, nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 can achieve 100%, 99.9%, 100% and 96.9%-reachability respectively. The unreachability is only caused by intermittent loopy routes, and no routes get damped as the SRCI mechanism accounts for cyclical routing dependencies while counting RFD penalties.
IX. RELATED WORK
As deployed today, BGP implicitly assumes that all ASes make truthful announcements. As a result, it is trivial for a malicious (or even a benignly misconfigured) router or AS to commit crippling attacks on both the control plane and data plane of BGP. For example, it can hijack the prefix, or spoof a route (control plane attacks), or drop, divert or delay forwarding traffic (data plane attacks). For a comprehensive description of BGP attacks, see [13] .
A number of schemes have been proposed to secure BGP's control plane as well as data plane. The control plane defenses, from the weakest to the strongest, include origin authentication [24] , which uses a trusted database to verify IP prefix ownership, secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [36] , which provides both origin authentication and the verification of the physical existence of the announced path, and S-BGP [18] , which not only verifies prefix ownership and existence, but also uses digital signatures to authenticate each BGP update message. Currently, IETF is considering standardizing a variant of S-BGP, named BGPsec [11] . BGPsec uses a resource certificate mechanism named Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [1] , [2] . RPKI provides certifications for IP prefixes and AS numbers, and these certifications can be used by BGPsec when RPKI is either partially or fully deployed. At the time of writing, over 10K prefixes and AS numbers have been associated with valid certifications in the RIRs' repository [9] . For data plane security, verification and detection [13] , [17] , [33] , [37] guarantee that a path that appears in a BGP announcement message is actually being used to forward traffic, thereby protecting against dropping and diverting attacks'.
Our focus in this paper is on control plane attacks. Specifically, we ask the question: assuming BGPSec-like authentication and integrity mechanisms, how vulnerable is BGP to control plane attacks? Somewhat disturbingly, we find that even a single malicious router or AS can launch control plane attacks violate rather basic reachability and policy-related properties. This is because existing proposals for control plane security, although critical for verifying the authenticity of announced routes compared to today's implicit-trust model, are by design not sufficient to protect against attacks that exploit the dynamics of the complex BGP protocol.
Our control plane attacks are complementary to and exist irrespective of the presence of data plane attacks or verification mechanisms to thwart them. This is because data plane security measures are designed to defend against malicious ASes on the forwarding path, however in our attacks, an off-path malicious AS can permanently disable a route consisting of only good ASes. A more detailed comparison of our control plane attacks to known data plane attacks appears at the end of Section IV.
Our work is related to earlier studies in [32] , [38] , where the authors point out an attack example similar to one of our attacks. However, their attacks result only in temporary loss of connectivity. Further, attacks in [38] rely on a specific sequence of updates from other good ASes, and attacks in [32] can only disable the paths that go through the malicious AS. In comparison, the attacks identified in this paper (1) are more serious as they can cause permanent loss of connectivity and persistent violation of routing policy preferences; (2) can be performed unilaterally by a malicious AS; and (3) do not require the malicious AS to be on the disabled path(s). To our knowledge, this is the first paper to demonstrate attacks with all of the above three properties.
Our work is also related to another study [15] , where the authors show that existing control plane security protocols are not enough to prevent inordinate "traffic-attraction", wherein a malicious AS can craft route announcements so as to attract more traffic. As acknowledged by the authors, it is unclear if traffic attraction by itself (in the absence of data plane misbehavior) constitutes an attack as any AS by design has the freedom to export any available routes (including provider-to-provider routes at a higher cost to itself). Furthermore, with BGPSec, traffic attraction alone can not cause unreachability. In contrast, our attacks can cause permanent unreachability and policy inversion without any data plane misbehavior. This paper extends a published conference paper [31] that did not include the generalized attack scenarios, the conditions to ensure a successful attack under realistic, unpredictable network propagation delays, and the detailed implementation of our proposed solution.
X. CONCLUSION BGP, the Internet's interdomain routing protocol, has long been recognized as having serious security vulnerabilities. Although BGP security has seen well over a decade of work, most prior work in the spirit of BGPSec has focused on augmenting BGP with properties such as authentication and integrity and, more generally, on security issues that can be addressed in large part using traditional cryptographic techniques. However, BGP, being the complex protocol that it is, is still vulnerable to manipulation by malicious ASes even when augmented with cryptographic security mechanisms such as those in BGPSec. In this paper, we have identified two serious and previously unknown attacks based on manipulating timers that show that, despite the usage of S-BGP mechanisms, even a single malicious AS can disrupt reachability between a large number of ASes and prevent them from selecting routes according to their policy preferences. Our key contributionare are to (1) formalize two essential and intrinsically desirable properties-eventual reachability and policy prevalence; (2) show that BGP does not satisfy them; (3) experimentally validate the feasibility of these attacks on commodity routers and via simulations over the Internet's AS-level topology; and (4) design and implement mechanisms so as to achieve these properties despite the presence of malicious ASes. 
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